The Bridges at Brévands

By Ian Gardner

Please note this document is still in its early draft stages and Ian is anxious to hear from any 3rd Battalion 506th veterans who may wish to see amendments made to the article or add stories of their own.

If you would like to contact Ian you may e-mail him on karen.gardner1@ntlworld.com

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45 plane loads of C-47’s code named Serial 10 left Exeter Airfield around midnight on June 6th 1944 carrying 723 men of the Third Battalion 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment and 2 platoons from C/326th Airborne Engineers. 6,000 other paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division were also involved and together, they formed the spearhead for the invasion of France along with the 82nd Airborne Division and the British 1st Airborne. Their intended drop zone was DZ D which out of the 3 drop zones put to use that night, was the largest, and was also to be the default DZ for any lost aircraft from other units in the 101st. (n.b. British intelligence at Bletchley Park intercepted German radio traffic. This indicated that the Germans thought they were under attack from eight allied airborne divisions and not three).

DZ D covered an area of about 1km wide by 2km long and was just below Angoville-au-Plein. The nearest large town being Carentan. Serials 8 and 9 were also scheduled to jump onto D. They consisted of 1475 men from the 1st and 2nd Battalion 501st PIR along with another platoon of C Company 326th Airborne Engineers. They had left Merryfield Airfield on the Somerset/Devon border a little earlier than 3/506 and were due in to the DZ just before them.

Third Battalions primary objective on D-Day was to capture 2 wooden bridges and a ferry crossing point over the Douve river. These were located about 4km up the Douve from Carentan. The passenger chain ferry had been there sometime but was not a secure or efficient crossing point. The Germans built the footbridge on the seaward side first in late 1942. This was at Le Moulin and would have been 250m to the left of the foot ferry access ramp. The Germans must have realised fairly quickly that they also needed to have vehicle access from Carentan to Utah Beach.

By August 1943 work had started on widening and lengthening an access road from the Fortin Farm (the farm was to become the Regimental Aid Post (RAP) during the invasion) area to the riverbank. A distance of about 1.5km. With the 10 section prefabricated road bridge finally going in over Christmas 1943. The bridge was only wide enough for trucks and smaller armoured vehicles. The roadbridge was situated 1km upstream towards Carentan, out of sight of the footbridge and 750m to the right of the ferry ramp. There was also an old farmhouse just to the left of the footbridge, tucked in behind a second berm (a ten foot raised earth work) which ran parallel to the river retaining dyke. All the way back to the roadbridge.

Whilst researching we came across some errors in previously published works. They show and describe the bridges being the wrong way round. This came to light whilst studying the wartime aerial pictures. Which clearly showed that the road bridge was nearest to Carentan and the foot bridge was nearer to Brévands. Visiting the bridge site proved beyond doubt that we were right. We are in no doubt that 3/506 had adequate intelligence available. With aerial pictures and local information being supplied by the French, which allowed them to complete the sand tables (scale models) by mid-May 44. We feel that the Officers were suitably appraised and were confident in pinpointing their exact objectives. The bridge commander Capt. Charles Shettle did not reach the road bridge by sun up on June 6th by luck alone! He knew where he was and most probably most of the Seniors that came in after him knew it too! After all his was the most tactically important of the two bridges.

The original wartime map belonging to the 506th’s Planning & Intelligence Officer Maj. Hank Hanna ambiguously shows a hand drawn appreciation of the bridges with the number 6 next to what actually was the footbridge. Marked up in such a way as to resemble something larger. We think that this may have been interpreted by other historians as the road bridge. It is interesting to note that many of the veterans have argued that they were at the ‘footbridge’ or ‘roadbridge’only to be told it was the other way round! It does however show correctly what appears to be the front-line positions along the second berm behind the river dyke. There is a possibility that some of the information could have been added after Normandy. An original oversight was the failure to recognise the huge amount of land that was flooded, due to German operations at Le Barquette, and many maps were labelled ‘ground here probably soft’!!!

Further objectives were to form an enclave or bridgehead on the opposite side of the river and hold as a stepping stone for future offensive actions in the area. They were also to disrupt and cause chaos at every available opportunity to enemy communications and powerlines. Third Battalion was commanded by Lt. Col Robert Wolverton from West Virginia. One of the most popular and respected CO’s that the 506th had at the time.

C Company 326th Engineers supplied 2 Platoons to augment the two demolition trained sections drawn from 3/506 Regimental Head Quarters (RHQ) to attach explosives to the bridges, in case things did not go to plan. Therefore denying the crossing points to the enemy. The C/326th AEB supplied another platoon that enplaned with the 501st at Merryfield and had it’s own tasks within serials 8 and 9.

1/501 PIR’s objective that was the lock at Le Barquette which was about 3km upstream from the bridges. The Germans had left the gates open which had flooded the surrounding area as part of their anti-parachute plan. If the enemy had control of the lock it could have hampered the breakout from Utah beach. 1st Battalion was commanded by Lt.Col Robert Carroll.

2/501 PIR objectives were to destroy the road bridges along the N13 from St-Come-du-Mont to Carentan. Leading 2nd Battalion was Lt.Col Robert Ballard. However, these 4 bridges were not destroyed and fighting became fragmented and ineffectual much to the disappointment of straight talking and no-nonsense Col. Howard Johnson. He was the Commander of the 501st PIR and purely by a quirk of circumstances, had ended up in command of what was to become the lock force. Some of 3/506 ended up fighting with both Ballard’s and Johnson’s force.

The Pathfinders

MARKING THE DZ FOR THE MAIN DROP 00:47 hrs JUNE 6th

About 40 minutes before the first of the 3 serials were due to arrive. Three C47 plane loads of Pathfinders had landed to mark the area to guide in the main body. They were already about 20 minutes late due to a navigational error over the sea. The aircraft had then flown along the coast until recognising the mouth of the Douve. Turning in land they followed the river towards Carentan. As the 3 aircraft turned over the town to try to visually orientate themselves towards the DZ, every weapon that could be turned toward the aircraft opened up on them.

The Germans realised that something unusual was happening when the aircraft came round again in the direction of the drop zone. This was the final run in and under this intensive barrage the lead plane went off course, the other 2 aircraft followed suit and all 3 dropped the 60 or so men in a line 600m off centre of the DZ.

German troops were now alerted and were reinforcing the area. Amazingly the enemy had not expected the allies to be ready to mount parachute operations until much later in the month. Consequently many of the anti-parachute obstacles were still not finished by D-Day. In the following drama that was about to unfold, this timely miscalculation ultimately saved many allied lives.

Because of the intensive small arms fire and flares set off around them. The 3 teams and their respective defence elements could not assemble properly. They did what they could and set up two Morse signal beacons called Eureka sets. From which the letter D was sent as a signal to the oncoming aircraft. 1 Beacon was established on the run in between St-Come and the western edge of the DZ. The other was on the right hand periphery between Le Bordel (The burning barn) and the Fortin Farm (RAP). But under the circumstances these were enough to bring on the element leaders in serials 8, 9 and 10. Sadly the red ( lamp colour code for D) marker lights called Holophane Lamps could not be erected. These were to have been positioned in a T shape, with the top of the T facing down the line of flight. The lead aircraft would normally fly over the lights and the jump signal given when the plane passed over the top of the T. About 1 aircraft in 40 were equipped with the special Rebecca receiving equipment which allowed them to interpret the Eureka signals. About half of the 54 pathfinders were captured or killed during this most important part of Operation Neptune.

The 3 serials began to arrive first serial 8, then 9 and some 6 minutes later at 0140hrs Serial 10 carrying 3/506. The journey over the Peninsular had been fraught with fog banks and heavy anti-aircraft fire. This broke the formations up. The Rebecca equipped aircraft still managed to keep some sort of shaky formation together. But as ‘10’ was the very last serial to jump from the 101st, it had completely lost any element of surprise. The Germans then torched the barn at Le Bordel (which still lies at the eastern end of the DZ) and were waiting for 3/506 with everything that they had. All eyes were skyward, with the fire of the barn lighting everything within a 600m radius.

Frantically the jump began, in the strong crosswind, with some jumpers spending as little as 8 seconds under the canopy. Aircraft criss crossed the sky taking evasive action to avoid the crippling multicoloured ground fire arching up towards the planes. Many aircraft had endured this for at least 8 minutes whilst flying over the Peninsular and were lucky to have got this far. The 440th Troop Carrier Group would lose 3 C-47’s on this night which equates to a 10% loss rate from 3/506 and 1 from 441st TCG carrying C/326 AEB. A plane came down on the DZ and two more crashed up near St-Come, probably carrying some of the RHQ guys. One well known crash was at Magneville near Valognes where I Company, suffered the loss of 18 men when the plane was brought down by flak on it’s journey to the DZ.

In these key moments the aircrews tended to despatch the men to fast (up to 150knots), excessively low (450 feet or less) and did not feather the left hand (Port) engine to stop prop blast. Because of this exiting the plane became an appalling ordeal. The 506th at this point were using the British made and supplied leg bag, which had been forced upon them really without much preparation. This bag on D-Day weighed in at an additional 70lb’s and was designed to carry munitions and stores to be cached and used by the supporting elements within the Battalion. Such as 60mm Mortars, C2 plastic explosives, bazooka rounds, ammo and medical supplies. Many of these were torn off on exit due to airspeed (prop blast) and lost along with underslung A-5 containers, carrying many of the heavier weapon used for giving vital support to the rifle companies within the Battalion.

Men were quickly dispatched over St-Come-du-Mont, Carentan to Brévands. On both sides of the Douve, into both flooded and dry areas. Onto roofs all over the local area and the unlucky ones landing amongst enemy troop concentrations. It was a human lottery whose outcome dictated who lived, died and who got captured. But despite all this, the drop concentration was one of the best of all the serials that night!

Most of Battalion HQ landed in an Orchard which was also being used as a bivvy area by some Russian Cavalry. It suffered terribly losing 101 of 176 men. Many died including Lt.Col Wolverton whilst still in their harnesses. Hanging from the apple trees they were shot and bayoneted to death as they struggled to free themselves. Over the next few days this tragic episode would bring many of the guys close to tears when they learned of the appalling circumstances that led to the deaths of Lt.Col Wolverton, Major. George Grant his Executive Officer and many more at Battalion. Both Doctors were lost on the drop too, with one being captured and made to work in St-Come with the Germans. The other survived but never made it to the bridges. The Battalion 1st Sgt’s had been decimated in the drop and not one made it to the objective.

I Company took the most casualties that night, because of the first eureka beacons position. Most of their drop went in over St-Come. An enemy machine gun team was positioned in the church steeple and caused havoc during the landings. I Coy’s OC Capt John Mcknight was captured along with the many others who dropped into the town. For those who dropped over the orchards and on towards the centre of the drop zone it was not good. 1st Lt. John Kiley was given command of the Company when John Mcknight did not make it to the bridges. Whilst another I Coy Platoon Commander 1st Lt. James (Jeb) Holstun whilst inadvertently breaking cover was killed in similar circumstances to G Coys 1st Lt. Turner Chambliss. But in ‘Jebs’ case it was a heavy calibre anti-aircraft gun!

Capt Robert Harwick the commander of H Company was taken prisoner. He returned to take command of 3/506 on June 9th after escaping from the Germans. About 40 Paratroopers also from H Company dropped right into the arc of raging light that was fuelled by the fire from the barn. They were targeted right down to the ground by enemy small arms fire and died where they landed. Another 40 guys from H Company were inaccurately dropped 10 miles away near Omaha beach!

G Companies OC Capt Harold Van Antwerp drowned in the flooded area near Carentan with Lt. Joe Doughty having to take temporary command. G Company was perhaps the luckiest as they were miss-dropped mainly along the edge of the area from Carentan and along the sweep of the river.

The consequences of these events would have been much graver, if the old I Coy OC Capt Charles Shettle had not taken charge at the Road Bridge. He was now on the Battalion Staff. He had decided not to hang about waiting in the assembly area, but took the small group he had gathered with him to the bridges. It is interesting to note that all the SCR 300 Company radio operators were with their Company Commanders on the drop. The operators suffered the same fate as the Commanders. Which is why the bridge force had no communications.

Tues June 6th to 8th

3 DAYS AT THE BRIDGES

Reconstruction 1: With help from the Screaming Eagles Living History Group click here to see reconstruction photographs of D-Day at Brévands.

Before Dawn 2 small groups one led by Shettle and one by Lt. Turner Chambliss (G Coy) reached the bridge area at roughly the same time. Some of the guys from C/326th recognisable by their ‘Mohican’ haircuts had also turned up with a load of C2 explosives. On the way in they had blown up the main Carentan power line! It was this C2 that the small team from C/326th and 3/506 RHQ Demolitions used to wire the road bridge a little later on that morning.

1st Lt. Chambliss who was probably one of the tallest men in the Battalion. Skinny as a rake, a strict career soldier but fair with his enlisted men, had a lot of the Platoon Leaders with him in his party. These included: I companies: 1st Lts John Kiley, Charlie (Sandy) Santarsiero (who would the following day win the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions at the footbridge. (Sandy, now in his 80’s and very ill, has friends in Scranton, Pennsylvania who are campaigning to have his award upgraded to The Congressional Medal of Honour) and John Kiley from I Company. Also present were 1st Lt’s Joe Doughty, Jim Morton and 2nd Lt Linton Barling from G Company and 1st Lt’s Ken Christianson, Dick Meason, and 2nd Lt. Rudy Bolte all from H Company and about 15 enlisted men. Jim Morton had broken his ankle on the jump and had given Turner his aerial photo of the area to navigate them in to the bridges by.

This gave Shettle about 60 men at his disposal. They were drawing fire all the way in to the bridge area. From behind them somebody fired five 60mm mortars which landed near the bridge to their front. This spooked the enemy, whom by the time the two groups reached the bridge, had returned back over the far side. But tragically as Turner Chambliss looked over the top of the dyke, neatly silhouetting himself, he was shot in the throat and killed by 2 sniper rounds from across the river. It must have dawned on the small force at that point, just how vulnerable they all were!

At the road bridge Capt Shettle quickly organised two small 5 man H Coy assault platoons and a two man light machine-gun team. Under cover of darkness they had to get over the bridge P.D.Q. and establish a fire base. The 1st H Company crossed the bridge under covering fire from the LMG but daylight was now breaking. The second team made the crossing underneath the bridge using the pre-fabricated sections to avoid enemy machine-gun fire. This was becoming more accurate with the arrival of daylight. These teams were led aggressively by H Companies 1st Lt. Ken Christianson and 2nd Lt. Rudy Bolte.

The original plan was to use rubber boats to cross the river that night. Pfc Jim Martin of G Coy was earmarked by Turner Chambliss to tow the boats across with equipment etc. The use of paddles was thought to noisy so Jim being a good underwater swimmer, got the job! Luckily for Jim, the boats were lost on the jump so the event never took place. Imagine having gone through the ringer getting to the bridges and then having to swim across the Douve under fire! What a guy! Jim found out that Turner had been killed when his group moved in to the ferry ramp area on the 2nd day. This was near some of the H Coy guys who quickly passed on the sad news.

The breakout attempt was abandoned as the Platoon Leaders realised that the size of the German force on the other side was growing and their ammo was fast running out. Later in the morning the small force clambered back underneath the bridge, under covering fire from Shettles force, past some of the engineers, wiring the bridge for demolition. So clearly all was not well!!! As the morning wore on, small groups were joining the line. Many had made it after struggling through the flooded ditches, enemy pillboxes and heavily fortified positions during the night, the morning seemed quite welcome. However, movement in daylight was becoming more and more dangerous. Men arriving later into the line were hampered by enemy artillery, mortar and sniper fire, coming from the hill overlooking the line. Despite this a small group was successfully sent out to forage for supplies over in the area of the drop.

Another group led by Dick Meason went out to try to find radio equipment. They found nothing, but in the process captured about a dozen or so Hungarian volunteers. Dick managed to drop one of them at about 100m with his army issue .45 pistol. The odds were stacked against Dick, but he did it. Much to the amazement of the guys with him at the time!

There was an unofficial no prisoner policy in Normandy. At least not for the first 3 days, as it was felt that no provision could be made for them during this period. However on this occasion, the RAP was well established and Shettle sent them back to be held there at the Fortin Farm. The next day they were to be joined by many more POW’s from the action by the footbridge.

Shettle had hoped that in the groups arriving would be someone with a radio. But nobody showed up, personnel from the communications platoon arrived but without radios. He had seen the 16 inch shells from USS Kansas. Which was steaming 8 miles off Utah beach, raining down on La Basse Addeville and he guessed correctly that they were being directed by the 501st. So he figured that he should try to get to Le Barquette and make contact with General Maxwell Taylor or the 506th CO Colonel Bob Sink. Le Barquette was nearer than Addeville.

The Germans who had been defending the DZ were now trying to get machine gun teams in behind Shettle. These teams were luckily destroyed by the small groups of stragglers who were still making their way in to the objective. If the enemy MG teams had made it into position the bridge force would not have lasted the day out.

By midday the sun was shining but rain was on the way and the small groups that had dug in were organised by the nearest senior NCO’s. Everyone was mixed up and had to dig in where they hit the line. Therefore many did not have friends or familiar faces around them. Even though the mood was upbeat, things were still very informal with the 100 or so men now spread out along the 1km front between the footbridge, ferry ramp and roadbridge. The men further up the line toward Brévands seemed to have more ammo than the men at the roadbridge, but every single one of them knew that they had a vital job to do. It would seem likely that most of the foxholes were dug on the second raised pathway berm a little way back from the actual river dyke.

They had 3 days rations ie 9 packets of k’s. Movement now was impossible except directly behind the line, the men held their positions despite lack of at this point an overall command structure. That would come later in the day. They passed messages up and down the line as best they could from group to group. Unable to return fire, each small group took care of it’s own duties and administration. A kind of stand off was developing with the only enemy activity being snipers and artillery. Defences were constantly being strengthened all the time.

Reconstruction 2: With help from the Screaming Eagles Living History Group click here to see reconstruction photographs of D-Day plus 1 at Brévands.

The 88mm gun dug in opposite the footbridge really started becoming a nuisance at this point. The 88 was only 300m away from the footbridge force. Paratroopers in this area could do nothing apart from bury themselves at the bottom of their foxholes when the gun fired. Luckily the thickness of the 2nd berm stopped most of the shells doing to much damage, however there were instances behind the line when the 88 and mortars caught men unaware’s when they had inadvertently left cover. ‘Don’t draw fire! it tends to upset the people around you!’

However what was left of 3/506 was in position, denying the enemy the vital road bridge and containing them on the right hand flank of the airhead. Shettle could consider himself very lucky indeed. But he worried how long he could hold out, wondering why the Germans had not put in a major counter assault against his positions. Perhaps initially confusion in the German Command had stalled any plans they had to go on the offensive. If the Germans had come across and in effect broken out behind the Utah beach area, the outcome and it’s effects might have been very different! Although the enemy had crossed over onto the US side during D-night, they did not put up a strong defence but retreated hastily when Shettles force turned up at the bridge.

Shettle realised that he had to stay at all cost, but was boxed in. Reinforcements and supplies coming in to his positions could not be moved down the line towards the footbridge. To do this meant moving up and over the access road into the bridge. This put anyone attempting it in full view of the enemy. Who were by now hiding out in the high marsh grass on the opposite bank. So an idea was hatched by one of the Regimental demolition guys.

Pfc Jack Agnew blows a trench with C2 explosives across the roadway. This worked and allowed men to move up and down to reinforce the line using the second raised walkway berm that lay just behind the main river dyke for cover. This allowed the Platoon leaders with some men to get to the other end and help organise anybody who was already there. But this did not solve the 88 problem and Shettle knew that he had to get to Le Barquette and Col Johnson to communicate with General Maxwell Taylor at Division and get supplies, reinforcements and bring down fire on the hillside opposite his positions.Meanwhile Turner Chambliss’s body was taken to the RAP which was being manned by the Chaplain Capt.Tilden McGee. Because Dr. Stanley Morgan and his assistant Dr Bernie Ryan had not turned up for reasons previously mentioned. Chaplain McGee had been a regular army medic before the war, so he felt he should stay and tend the injured.

Shettle decided to make contact with Le Barquette and made his way with two enlisted men along the river bank to where he met the most forward perimeter guard of Johnsons force. They were then escorted into the lock force positions only to find that Col Johnson had seconded men from 3/506 and C/326 to make up gaps in his defence and had more men in his RAP. Including I Coy’s 1st Sgt Paul Garrison with a broken ankle. Johnson flatly refused to let the men go but allowed Shettle to use his Forward Artillery Observer to contact the navy (who was effectively bringing fire down on Carentan and St-Come) to pass on the message via the fleet to General Taylor. It was received, but unknown to Shettle at the time. Never passed on! Shettle returned back later that day with the conviction that help would be on the way!

Some of the US forces stayed out in depth until the second day and with active night patrolling starting it was safer for them to come back into the bridge area. Some of the main approach ditches to the bridges were manned to help usher people in safely. One such group was Jimmy Martin’s. NCO’s began organising their men to go out and find enemy positions and set ambushes. Often spooking the cows who were always being mistaken for hostiles at night! French livestock was roaming all over Normandy and behind the bridges was no exception. Patrolling was dangerous and the cattle did not help. Many people were hurt whilst carrying out these activities. G Coys Pfc Jim Foster was paralysed for life during one of these night missions.

The Fortin Farm RAP was established shortly after the drop as a collection point for the wounded by a small group of medics, a doctor from the 501 and two priests, Father Mcgee (3/506) and Father Sampson (501). Mcgee would do further fine work here but inevitably people had to move on to their respective unit locations. The building is still in the hands of the Fortin family and sits on the edge of the DZ near the bridges. It was receiving fire from the Germans on D-Day which caused the deaths of 2 French civilians later that afternoon. At which point white and red sheets were fixed to the roof (which could clearly be seen from the enemy side of the Douve) in the shape of a red cross. Incoming fire dropped off and the Aid Station continued to do it’s job well. Father McGee left the RAP in the hands of a mixed group of medical personnel and joined Shettle at the Bridges a day or so later.

I Companies 1st Lt. Charles Santarsiero stops a German attack on Wednesday 7th. Jim’s group which had just arrived on the line, comprised of about 14 men led by Sgts Austin and Skeen. They were moving in toward their allocated position, just behind the ferry jetty berm. When they were caught unawares by an enemy MG42 machine gun. Firing from a treeline across the other side of the field behind their area. They hit the ground and before they began to return fire Pfc Don Francis who was lying next to Jim, was hit in the head and mortally wounded. The Battalion of German Marines who were retreating from the direction of St-Marie du-Mont, started to commit several companies to the assault. They had only seen the small G Coy group at this point. But had not seen 1st.Lt Charlie Santarsiero moving round on the right hand side of them.

Santarsiero saw the Germans approaching through Binoculars, but had not been able to contact Skeens group so spent the initial stages gathering a team (similar in size to Skeen’s) together to launch a counter assault. He had left Linton Barling (G) to look after business at the footbridge whilst he carefully moved his men into position and prepared for the coming attack. Santarsiero and his group poured an accurate volley of fire into the advancing enemy who were by now about 75m away. The MG42 now turned it’s attention away from the other group and towards Santarsiero. The fire was close but the cover afforded to the group was such that this did not stop them decimating the leading German troops and their officers. Santarsiero used a 30-06 M1 with skill and personally accounted for many of the German casualties.

White flags appeared a couple of times from the enemy out in the field. But these were just attempts to get in closer to the footbridge. It became a kind of turkey shoot and as the ammo ran low, Sandy and T5 Joe Barrera from Company HQ decided to walk out and secure a surrender and stop the killing. Before long all the other Germans were surrendering too. They were quickly disarmed and Sandy instructed his paratroopers to evacuate the wounded on both sides on individual medical needs and nothing else. The first casualty treated was an older German who had a large bleeding wound in his kidney area.

About 10 minutes later, the MG42 team broke cover and surrendered handing the weapon over. They were waiting to see how the Americans treated the wounded and the POW’s to decide what they were going to do. This act of compassion undoubtedly saved Sandy and Joe’s lives, as they stood amongst the huge amount of dead and injured that littered the field whilst trying to take the surrender of about 180 men. The Machine gun was absorbed into the footbridge force, whilst prizes like Lugers and the occasional camera were acquired by the guys who were milling about amongst them only minutes later.

For protecting the left hand flank of the bridge force, 1st Lt. Charles Santarsiero was later awarded the DSC for his actions. Don Francis was moved along with the Germans to the Fortin Farm where he died of wounds. At this time the aid station was still being manned by people from other units. 1st Lt. Joe Doughty was asked by the medics to confirm a list of KIA’s within G Company. As he scanned the list he noticed Pfc. James Martin on it! He had spoken with Jimmy earlier and believing him still to be alive, checked the body. It was Don Francis. The body had been identified through a specially made jump knife that Jimmy Martin had sold to Don for 6 bucks some time before. It still had Jimmy Martins name on the scabbard! What happened to Don’s dog tag’s remains a mystery. If Joe Doughty had not checked the body, then Jim’s parents would have almost certainly been told he was dead!

It was later suspected that the enemy were using the old farmhouse about 200m to the left of their position by the ferry jetty, to spot US positions from. A small team went out using the dyke for cover, led by Sgt Charles Skeen of G Company to take a look. There was no sign of the enemy but hot food was still on the table! As the group left the house, voices were heard coming from the basement. Skeen threw two grenades down and the voices stopped. They did not hang around to view the damage as it was quickly realised that French civilians were most likely hiding there. Skeen was not a people person and therefore was never popular with the men. Some of the 2nd platoon guys had said that they would shoot him when they got into combat! Although he performed well during this stage of the campaign, he was soon to be removed from G Company and posted to the rear echelon Service Company.

3 P-51 Mustangs appeared early over the bridges. They had already buzzed Le Barquette and recognised the cerise airpanels laid out on the ground as friendly. The same device was used at the bridges but was ignored by the aircraft. There intelligence had told them to destroy the bridges because they thought that they were in enemy hands. The panels were probably dismissed by the pilots as a German trick. As they pressed home the attack, the bombs neatly took out the centre and both ends of the roadbridge. The footbridge was not quite so bad with only the US side and the centre being hit. Everyone hugged the bottom of their foxholes, casualties were sustained as the bombs wreaked havoc along the river bank. While water and timber were raining down only Chaplain McGee, with his faith and an air panel in hand jumped up and down to attract the attention of the planes. But it was to late and all the Battalions hard work had been for nothing. Shettle must have been sick to his stomach when he realised that his message had not got through.

On the 8th of June Lt’s Santarsiero and Barling are sent out on foot by Shettle to make contact with Division roughly in the direction of Vierville. They ended up at Hiesville and reported everything that had happened to General McAuliffe. It was generally thought by the Commanders of the Division that they had ceased to exist as a unit. It was a complete surprise to see the 2 men. They were asked to take the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment back with them as a relief force. This they did and the 19 Officers and 117 enlisted men of 3/506th left the area early on the evening of June 8th. During the 3 days on the line they had sustained 7 killed and 21 wounded.

Sadly the importance of this part of the battlefield is often overlooked and mis-reported. Without any communications, working totally independently from the rest of the 101st the officers and men from 3/506th undoubtedly affected the way the invasion ultimately unfolded.

Jim Martin remembers word coming down the line to prepare to move out. They stood up with their backs to the hill and walked slowly away from the area. Not a shot came from the enemy! We feel that the Germans most probably had withdrawn to defend Carentan when the bridges were blown earlier. This would have coincided with a further aerial bombing which destroyed the 88. No doubt the breakout of allied forces from Omaha Beach would also have been a contributing factor.

A full Pontoon bridge was put in place by Monday June 12th and was situated 125m or so upstream from the footbridge. With a new access road being put in to service it, coming in from the north east.

Reconstruction 3: With help from the Screaming Eagles Living History Group click here to see reconstruction photographs of D-Day plus 1 and 2 at Brévands.

Aerial 12/6/44 Legend

1. THE ROADBRIDGE.
2. TRENCH BLOWN ON ROADWAY.
3. THE FORTIN FARM REGIMENTAL AID POST
4 FRONTLINE 2ND BERM
5. FERRY JETTY RAMP
6. FOOTBRIDGE
7. OLD FARMHOUSE
8. PONTOON BRIDGE
9. POSSIBLE 88 POSITION
10. POSSIBLE CRASH SITE

Acknowledgements

The following list of veterans, books and documents have been very helpful to me during the course of my research. To them all I offer my sincere thanks:

James Martin, G Coy 3/506th PIR
Xenia, Ohio

David Berry, Pathfinder Historian
Dayton, Ohio

Air Photo Archive, Keele University
Keele, Staffordshire ST5 5BG, England
Telephone/Fax: +44 (0)1782 583395
C/O Mrs. M.C. Beech

The 101st Airborne at Normandy. Mark Bando
101st Airborne, The Screaming Eagles at Normandy. Mark Bando

Currahee Scrapbook 101st Airborne Division 20th July 1942-4th July 1945

D-Day with the Screaming Eagles. George Koskimaki

The Story of a Soldier 1940-1971. Ivan Paul Mehosky

Order of Battle Operation Overlord Utah Beach and the US Airborne Divisions 6th June 1944
James Arnold and Roberta Wiener

Magneville Ce Jour La 6 Juin 1944. Philippe R. Nekrassoff and Eric Brissard

Night Drop The American Airborne Invasion of Normandy. S.L.A Marshall

Hank Hannah's wartime map

© Copyright 2004 Ian Gardner

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